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ABSTRACT 
This paper analyzes the effect of joint-product export smuggling on the 
revenue-maximizing export tax rate and tax revenue collection under the small 
country assumption. The results indicate that the effect of introducing joint­
product export smuggling is dependent on whether legal and illegal exports are 
considered a substitutable or complementary activity for the exporting firm. 
The results of the model are applied to the issue of cigarette smuggling 
in the United States. The paper concludes that if legal and illegal interstate 
trade in cigarettes are substitutable activities for firms in the wholesale 
and retail tobacco industry, then states levying relatively high excise taxes 
should reduce their tax rates. This action will increase legal trade at the 
expense of illegal trade and raise the level of tax revenue collected. 
The proposed increase in the federal cigarette excise tax to fund health 
care reform is also discussed within the framework of the paper's model. The 
model suggests that a substantial increase in the federal cigarette tax may 
generate over-invoicing of cigarette exports and thereby reduce the market 
share of legal cigarettes. A rise in the cigarette tax rate could therefore 
have an ambiguous effect on tax revenues collected and jeopardize the funding 
of the health care program. (JEL: Fl3, H26, H21) 
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I. Introduction. 
The smuggling of imports and exports is a common phenomenon in lesser 
developed countries where high tariff or export tax rates are levied on traded 
goods. Trade taxes have a long history of being used as a revenue raising 
device in the third world. 
This paper expands on the work by Johnson (1972), Bhagwati and 
Srinivasan (1973), Pitt (1981), and Deardorff and Stolper (1990) by examining 
the effect of smuggling on trade tax rates and revenue collection. A partial 
equilibrium export tax revenue maximization model is presented in this paper. 
The results of the analysis indicate that the introduction of joint-product 
export smuggling alters the revenue-maximizing export tax rate. It is 
demonstrated that the revenue-maximizing tax rate and revenue collected will 
rise or fall depending on whether legal and illegal trade are complementary or 
substitutable activities, respectively, for the exporting firm. 
II. Assumptions on the Exporting Firm and the Export Supply Function. 
The country is assumed to produce a pure export good, and the domestic 
export producing firm is assumed to be a price taker in the world market. The 
goal of the government is to maximize export tax revenue. If firms in the 
export industry engage in smuggling, then they produce a joint-product export, 
assumed to be of the type described in the paper by Pitt (1981).1 Pitt 
described a smuggling firm that produced a joint-product export good composed 
of a legal export unit combined with an illegal export unit. Pitt's smuggling 
production function embodied a real resource cost associated with smuggling, a 
1 A number of papers in the smuggling literature have developed joint­
product smuggling models. For examples, see Martin and Panagariya (1984), 
Thursby et al. (1991), and Fausti (1992). 
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confiscation cost associated with smuggling, and legal trade as a cover for 
illegal trade. With respect to the model presented below, Pitt's confiscation 
cost assumption is modified by assuming that confiscation revenues collected 
by the government just offset the real resource cost of enforcement incurred 
by the government. 
The country's export supply function is assumed to have two possible 
states of nature: 1) all firms engage in legal trade only; and 2) all firms 
engage in joint-product smuggling. Under state 1, the export supply function 
is assumed to be a function of the tax distorted world price of exports: 
pf• (l-t)-Pt. Holding the world price pf constant, the export supply function 
is defined as L (t), L' (t) < 0, where t is the percentage tax rate levied on 
exports. Under state 2, the legal export supply function, L (t,S), is defined 
as a function of the export tax rate and the smuggling supply function, S (t), 
S'(t)> 0. It is assumed that joint-product smuggling generates Pitt's price 
disparity result, such that ps, the equilibrium price under state 2, is 
greater than pt, the equilibrium price under state 1. Finally, it is assumed 
that all other factors affecting the legal export supply function under both 
states of nature are held constant. 
Ill. The Effect of Joint-Product Smuggling on Total Exports and Trade Tax 
Revenues. 
The first issue addressed is the effect of the introduction of joint-
product smuggling on total exports, legal exports, and tax revenue collection: 
PROPOSITION 1. The introduction of joint-product smuggling will: 1) increase 
total export production; and 2) have an ambiguous effect on legal exports. 
Thus, the introduction of joint-product smuggling has an ambiguous effect on 
tax revenue collection. 
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The small country assumption made earlier implies that the demand for exports 
is perfectly elastic. Assuming that the level of total export production (X), 
after the export tax is levied but before smuggling is introduced, is equal to 
(1) 
After smuggling is introduced, the level of total export production is equal 
to the sum of legal and illegal exports, 
X2 = Lz + Sz. (2) 
Assume the supply of total exports has a positive relationship with the 
price of exports. The introduction of joint-product smuggling generates price 
disparity, ps � pt _ This implies the production of total exports increases, X2 
� X1 • Substituting for X2 , we have Lz + S2 � X1 , or equivalently, S2 � X1 - L2 • 
The presence of smuggling implies that 
S2 � O. Substituting for X1 produces inequality (3), 
(3) 
Inequality (3) demonstrates that the production of exports destined to be 
marketed via illegal channels is greater than the change in the production of 
exports destined to be marketed via legal channels. However, as in Pitt's 
paper, it can not be determined if the amount of X marketed via legal trade 
channels increases or decreases. Therefore, the effect of smuggling on export 
tax revenues is ambiguous.2 The above discussion establishes proposition 1. 
2 Fausti (1992) used this approach to discuss the impact of smuggling on 
total exports. Pitt (1981) , and Deardorff and Stolper (1990) also derive 
ambiguous results for the effect of the introduction of smuggling on legal 
trade. They indicate that the introduction of smuggling could actually 
increase tax revenue collected. 
The preceding analysis is an alternative way of presenting Pitt's 
discussion of tax revenue maximization.3 However, an interesting implication 
of Pitt's tax revenue maximization analysis has been overlooked. Pitt 
demonstrates that a positive level of smuggling may be necessary to maximize 
tax revenue. In order for a positive level of smuggling to increase legal 
trade and tax revenues, i.e., L2>L1, legal and illegal trade must be 
complementary activities for the exporting firm. This would be a plausible 
assumption for the Pitt type of smuggling. However, for the Bhagwati and 
Hansen (1973) type of clandestine smuggling, one would expect legal and 
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illegal goods to be substitutes. If legal and illegal trade are assumed to be 
substitutable activities in a joint-product smuggling model, then the 
introduction of smuggling will reduce legal exports and tax revenue, L1>L2 • 
IV. The Effect of Joint-Product Smuggling on the Revenue-Maximizing Export 
Tax Rate. 
The export tax rate is set to maximize revenues collected before joint-
product smuggling begins (state 1). Since it is assumed that the country 
produces a pure export good, domestic consumption can be ignored. Domestic 
production and thus export supply are solely dependent on the exogenous world 
price for the exported good. Any tax levied on exports must be fully absorbed 
by domestic producers. Given this set of circumstances, the legal export 
supply function as defined under state 1 is L (t).4 The government's total 
revenue function is defined as, 
3 See Pitt (1981, p. 453) for his discussion of tax revenue maximization 
in the presence of joint-product smuggling. 
4 If one assumes that legal trade is a function of the domestic price of 
exports, L (P), and P - pf · (l-t), the results remain unaltered. The decision 
to make legal trade a function of the tax was done to simplify the mathematics 
presented in the paper. 
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TR - t•Pf •L (t) , define L'<O, where L'-dL/dt. 5 (4) 
Total tax revenue is defined as tax revenue collected on exports 
evaluated at world prices. To determine the revenue-maximizing tax rate, the 
first derivative (dTR/dt) is derived and set to zero in equation (5) and the 
revenue-maximizing tax rate is given in equation (6), 
(5) 
t0 - - (L/L') >0. (6) 
When joint-product smuggling is introduced, the government's total 
revenue function is altered by replacing the legal export supply function L (t) 
in equation 4 with L (t, S) . The supply of legal exports is now a function of t 
and S (state 2) . Following the same procedure as above, the revenue-
maximizing tax rate in the presence of smuggling is derived, 
TR - t1 •P
f •L (t, S) , and define S'>O, where S'=dS/dt. 6 
t1 - -LI (Lt, + Ls·S') > 0. 
(7) 
(8) 
(9) 
In equations 8 & 9, the term Ls·S' captures the indirect effect of a marginal 
change in the tax rate on the supply of legal exports. From the discussion 
above, its sign is dependent on whether legal and illegal export trade are 
substitutable or complementary activities for the exporting firm, Ls<O or Ls>O 
respectively. The partial derivative 8L/8t Lt < 0 represents the direct 
effect of a marginal change in the tax rate on the supply of legal exports. 
5 It is assumed that in the absence of smuggling, tax revenue collection 
is a cost-less activity for the government. The tax revenue generated by the 
export tax is assumed to increase, attain a maximum and then decline as the 
tax rate rises. 
6 It is assumed that the real resource cost associated with government 
enforcement against smuggling is exactly offset by the confiscation revenues 
collected by enforcement officials. 
Under the assumption that the direct effect dominates the indirect effect, t1 
> 0. Equation (9) brings the discussion to proposition 2: 
PROPOSITION 2. The introduction of joint-product smuggling will reduce the 
revenue-maximizing tax rate if BL/85<0, increase the revenue-maximizing tax 
rate if BL/85>0, and leave it unaltered if BL/85-0. 
To establish proposition 2, the ratio 
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t1/to = (-L'/L)· (-L /[Lt,+Lg•S']) L' /[Lt,+Lg•S'] (10) 
is examined under the following assumptions: 1) 8L/8S - O; 2) 8L/8S <0; 
and 3) aL/as > o. 
When Lg= 0, it indicates that the exporting of legal and illegal goods 
are unrelated activities. This implies that once the exporting firm decides to 
engage in smuggling, the amount the firm decides to smuggle is independent of 
the amount it decides to export via legal channels. While this assumption is 
intuitively unappealing, it implies that the ratio in eq. 10 reduces to L'/Lt_. 
To simplify the analysis it is now assumed that the legal trade supply 
response to a change in the export tax rate is the same under both states of 
nature, L'=Lt, . Under this assumption t1/t0 - 1, and this indicates that the 
introduction of joint-product smuggling has no effect on the revenue 
maximizing tax rate. 
When it is assumed that Lg< 0, the implication is that the exporting of 
legal and illegal goods are substitutable activities for the exporting firm. 
This implies that once the exporting firm decides to engage in smuggling, the 
amount of legal trade it engages in declines, reducing total tax revenues 
collected. Also when Lg< 0, the ratio t1/t0 < 1, indicating the tax rate must 
be reduced in order to maximize the tax revenue collected. 
When it is assumed that Lg> 0, it indicates that legal and illegal 
trade are complementary activities for the exporting firm. This implies that 
7 
once the exporting firm decides to engage in smuggling, the amount of legal 
trade the firm engages in will increase and total tax revenues collected by 
the government will rise . Under this assumption Lg >  0, the ratio t1/t0 > 1, 
indicating that the tax rate must be increased in order to maximize the tax 
revenue collected. 
The effect of smuggling on the revenue-maximizing tax rate can also be 
explained within the framework of a Laffer Curve, i . e., a tax revenue/tax rate 
diagram. If legal and illegal trade are complementary activities (Lg>O) for 
the exporting firm, then the introduction of smuggling will shift the Laffer 
Curve up and to the right. If the initial tax rate remains unchanged after 
the shift, it will be to the left of the tax rate that would maximize tax 
revenue in the presence of smuggling . On the other hand, if legal and illegal 
trade are substitutable activities (Lg<O) for the exporting firm, then the 
introduction of smuggling will shift the Laffer Curve down and to the left. 
If the initial tax rate remains unchanged after the shift, it will be to the 
right of the tax rate that would maximize tax revenue in the presence of 
smuggling.7 
The contribution of this paper is to introduce the concept of legal and 
illegal trade as being either complementary or substitutable activities for 
the exporting firm. An analysis of the consequences stemming from this 
contribution for the revenue maximizing tax rate and tax revenue collected 
provides an answer to the contradictory results found in the smuggling 
literature on these issues. 
7 A graphical exposition of the effect smuggling has on total tax 
revenues can be found in the appendix . 
In the clandestine smuggling literature, Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1973) 
demonstrate that the introduction of smuggling reduces tax revenue collected 
for a given tax rate. This result is consistent with legal and illegal trade 
being substitutable activities. A comparison of revenue-maximizing tax rates 
under the smuggling and non-smuggling scenarios is not possible with the 
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Bhagwati and Srinivasan model. The ranking of the revenue-maximizing tax rate 
in the presence of smuggling below the rate for non-smuggling was presented in 
a paper by Johnson (1972). His result is consistent with legal and illegal 
trade being substitutable activities. With respect to the relationship 
between legal and illegal trade, the results of the clandestine smuggling 
literature indicate an implicit assumption of legal and illegal trade being 
substitutable activities for the smuggling firm. 
In the joint-product smuggling literature the issue of ranking revenue-
maximizing tax rates for the smuggling and non-smuggling scenario has not been 
addressed. Pitt (1981), Deardorff and Stolper (1990) and Fausti (1992) 
address the comparison of tax revenue collected issue and they arrive at 
ambiguous results.8 The ambiguous results would become deterministic and 
consistent with the results derived in this paper if an additional assumption 
is made with respect to whether legal and illegal trade are substitutable or 
complementary activities for the smuggling firm. 
Other papers in the joint-product and clandestine smuggling literature 
do not address the issue of whether legal and illegal trade are substitutable 
or complementary activities. For examples, see Thursby et al. (1991), Sheikh 
(1989), Scholer (1989), and Martin and Panagariya (1984). However, an implied 
8 Their results are called ambiguous because a positive level of 
smuggling only holds the possibility of increasing tax revenues. 
or overt assumption that legal and illegal trade is either a substitutable or 
complementary activity for the firm provides a common strand connecting trade 
flows, tax rates, and tax revenue implications discussed in the smuggling 
literature. 
V. Federal and State Excise Taxes and Smuggling: A Discussion.9 
The "buttlegging" of cigarettes is a type of smuggling that has arisen 
in the U.S. because of state excise tax differentials . 10 In a recent paper on 
joint-product smuggling by Thursby et al . (1991), commercial interstate 
cigarette smuggling between states was used to provide empirical support for 
the price disparity phenomena generated in their theoretical model . The 
9 
results of the model presented in this paper suggest that if legal and illegal 
interstate commercial trade in cigarettes represent substitutable activities 
for the firm, then in high tax states where smuggling is most pervasive the 
tax rate should be reduced in order to increase revenues and reduce smuggling 
activity. 
Smuggling to avoid the federal excise tax on cigarettes is non-existent 
today because of tight regulatory control over cigarette manufacturers who are 
required to pay the federal excise tax on domestic consumption . The American 
conswner purchased and paid federal and state taxes on 510 billion cigarettes 
in 1991. The cigarette industry, however, is not subject to an export tax, and 
9 The price effect of state and federal excise taxes on cigarettes is 
analogous to a tariff levied on an imported good . The model's results derived 
in the previous section can be applied to the cigarette industry based on the 
symmetry between import and export taxes as described by Lerner (1936). 
1° For discussion and empirical analysis of interstate cigarette 
smuggling in the U.S . ,  see Baltagi and Goel (1987), Baltagi and Levin (1986), 
Sullivan (1985), and Johnson (1984) . 
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the industry exported approximately 180 billion cigarettes or 9 billion packs 
in 1991.11 
The Clinton administration has suggested that one way to fund health 
care reform is to increase the federal cigarette excise tax, by as much as 2 
dollars a pack.12 This action may spawn the type of smuggling found in 
Indonesia, Sudan, and other third world countries. 13 These countries 
experience under- and over-invoicing of trade goods, misclassification of 
traded goods, etc, as firms try to avoid high trade taxes. If the federal 
excise tax becomes high enough, one could see over-invoicing of cigarette 
exports or the clandestine smuggling of exported American cigarettes back into 
the country . 14 The commencement of this type of illegal activity will affect 
tax revenue collection. 
The magnitude of the effect will depend on how pervasive smuggling 
becomes and whether legal and illegal trade in cigarettes are substitutable or 
complementary activities for the smuggling firm . If they are substitutable 
activities, then domestic legal trade in cigarettes will decline as compared 
to the non-smuggling situation. As a consequence, actual tax revenues may 
fall below projected levels and generate a shortfall in health care reform 
ll Additional data on the cigarette industry can be found in the USDA's 
Agricultural Statistics Yearbook 1992. 
12 For an insightful discussion on the issue of increasing the federal 
excise cigarette tax to fund heath care reform see the article by Warner 
(1993). 
13 A discussion of smuggling activity in these countries can be found in 
Cooper (1974), Pitt (1981), and Deardorff and Stolper (19 90). 
14 The tripling of the California state cigarette excise tax in 1989, and 
the large increase in the Canadian cigarette tax in 1991 have generated these 
types of smuggling activities. For a discussion of these issues see Bartlett 
(19 94). 
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funding. However, if they are complementary activities, then legal trade will 
increase, compared to the non-smuggling situation. As a consequence, actual 
tax revenue will be above projected levels for the non-smuggling situation. 
In either case, illegal activity will increase. 
VII. Summary. 
The analysis presented in this paper demonstrated that the relationship 
between illegal and legal trade determines the effect of smuggling on the 
revenue-maximizing tax rate and level of revenues collected. It was argued 
that assumption of legal and illegal trade being substitutable or 
complementary activities for the exporting firm was consistent with the 
literature on clandestine and joint-product smuggling, respectively. 
The results of the analysis were applied to the domestic cigarette 
market. The policy conclusions were based on alternative assumptions of 
whether legal and illegal trade were substitutable or complementary activities 
for the firm. However, until the empirical question of "what is the actual 
relationship between legal and illegal trade in cigarettes?" is answered, a 
policy prescription would be premature. 
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VII. APPDIDIX: 
Diagram I 
Ls < 0 
tax revenue 
r, tax rate 
In diagram I, the tax revenue function (Laffer Curve) 
labeled TR0 represents the before smuggling case. The tax rate 
that maximizes tax revenue for this case is labeled t0 • Assume 
legal and illegal trade are substitutes. The introduction of 
illegal trade causes the total revenue curve to shift in and to 
the left, labeled TR1 • The revenue-maximizing tax rate in the 
presence of smuggling is now t1 • If legal and illegal trade are 
substitutable activities for the exporting firm, then the 
introduction of smuggling reduces the revenue-maximizing tax 
rate, t1 < to. 
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tax revenue 
Diagram II 
Ls > 0 
Lu r, 
15 
tax rate 
In diagram II, the tax revenue function (Laffer curve) 
labeled TRo again represents the before smuggling case. The tax 
rate that maximizes tax revenue for this case is labeled t0 • 
Assume legal and illegal trade are complements. The introduction 
of illegal trade causes the total revenue curve to shift out and 
to the right, labeled TR1 • The revenue-maximizing tax rate in the 
presence of smuggling is now t1 • If legal and illegal trade are 
complementary activities for the exporting firm, then the 
introduction of smuggling increases the revenue-maximizing tax 
rate, t1 > t0 • 
